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CASE OF REFAH PARTISI (THE WELFARE PARTY)
AND OTHERS v. TURKEY
( Applications nos. 41340/98, 41342/98, 41343/98 and 41344/98)
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
13 February 2003
This judgment is final but may be subject to editorial revision.
In the case of Refah Partisi (The Welfare Party) and Others v. Turkey,
The European Court of Human Rights, sitting as a Grand Chamber composed of the following judges:
Mr L. Wildhaber, President,
Mr C.L. Rozakis,
Mr J.-P. Costa,
Mr G. Ress,
Mr Gaukur Jorundsson,
Mr L. Caflisch,
Mr R. Turmen,
Mr C. Birsan,
Mr P. Lorenzen,
Mr V. Butkevych,
Mrs N. Vajic,
Mr M. Pellonpaa,
Mrs M. Tsatsa-Nikolovska,
Mr A.B. Baka,
Mr R. Maruste,
Mr A. Kovler,
Mrs A. Mularoni, judges,
and also of Mr P.J. Mahoney, Registrar,
Having deliberated in private on 19 June 2002 and on 22 January 2003,
Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on the last?mentioned date:
PROCEDURE
1. The case originated in four applications (nos. 41340/98, 41342/98, 41343/98 and 41344/98) against the Republic of Turkey lodged with the European Commission of Human Rights (“the Commission”) under former Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by a Turkish political party, Refah Partisi (The Welfare Party, hereinafter “Refah”) and three Turkish nationals, Mr Necmettin Erbakan, Mr Sevket Kazan and Mr Ahmet Tekdal (“the applicants”) on 22 May 1998.
2. The applicants alleged in particular that the dissolution of Refah by the Turkish Constitutional Court and the suspension of certain political rights of the other applicants, who were leaders of Refah at the material time, had breached Articles 9, 10, 11, 14, 17 and 18 of the Convention and Articles 1 and 3 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention.
3 . The applications were transmitted to the Court on 1 November 1998, when Protocol No. 11 to the Convention came into force (Article 5 § 2 of Protocol No. 11.
4. The applications were allocated to the Third Section of the Court (Rule 52 § 1 of the Rules of Court). They were joined (Rule 43 § 1) and on 3 October 2000 they were declared partly admissible by a Chamber of that Section (“the Chamber”), composed of the following judges: Mr J.-P. Costa, President, Mr W. Fuhrmann, Mr L. Loucaides, Mr R. Turmen, Sir Nicolas Bratza, Mrs H.S. Greve, Mr K. Traja, judges, and also of Mrs S. Dolle, Section Registrar.
5 . On 31 July 2001 the Chamber gave judgment, holding by four votes to three that there had been no violation of Article 11 of the Convention and unanimously that it was not necessary to examine separately the complaints under Articles 9, 10, 14, 17 and 18 of the Convention and Articles 1 and 3 of Protocol No. 1. The joint dissenting opinion of Judges Fuhrmann, Loucaides and Sir Nicolas Bratza was annexed to the judgment.
6. On 30 October 2001 the applicants requested, under Article 43 of the Convention and Rule 73, that the case be referred to the Grand Chamber.
On 12 December 2001 the panel of the Grand Chamber decided to refer the case to the Grand Chamber.
7. The composition of the Grand Chamber was determined according to the provisions of Article 27 §§ 2 and 3 of the Convention and Rule 24 of the Rules of Court.
8 . The applicants and the Government each filed a memorial.
9. A hearing took place in public in the Human Rights Building, Strasbourg, on 19 June 2002 (Rule 59 § 3).
There appeared before the Court:
(a) for the Government
Mr S. Alpaslan, Agent,
Mrs D. Akcay, Co-Agent,
Mr M. Ozmen, Co-Agent,
Mr Y. Belet, Counsel,
Mrs A. Gunyakti,
Mrs G. Acar,
Mrs V. Sirmen, Advisers;
(b) for the applicants
Mr L. Hincker,
Mrs M. Lemaitre,
Mr G. Nuss, Counsel,
Mrs V. Billamboz,
Mr M. Kamalak,
Mr S . Malkoc, Advisers.
One of the applicants, Mr Sevket Kazan, was also present.
The Court heard addresses by Mr Kazan, Mr Hincker and Mr Alpaslan.
THE FACTS
I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
A. The applicants
10. The first applicant, Refah Partisi (the Welfare Party, hereinafter “Refah”), was a political party founded on 19 July 1983. It was represented by its chairman, Mr Necmettin Erbakan, who is also the second applicant. He was born in 1926 and lives in Ankara. An engineer by training, he is a politician. At the material time he was a member of parliament and Refah's chairman.
The third applicant, Mr Sevket Kazan, who was born in 1933, lives in Ankara. He is a politician and a lawyer. At the material time he was a member of parliament and a vice-chairman of Refah. The fourth applicant, Mr Ahmet Tekdal, who was born in 1931, lives in Ankara. He is a politician and a lawyer. At the material time he was a member of parliament and a vice-chairman of Refah.
11. Refah took part in a number of general and local elections. In the local elections in March 1989 Refah obtained about 10% of the votes and its candidates were elected mayor in a number of towns, including five large cities. In the general election of 1991 it obtained 16.88% of the votes. The 62 MPs elected as a result took part between 1991 and 1995 in the work of parliament and its various committees, including the Committee on Constitutional Questions, which proposed amendments to Article 69 of the Constitution that became law on 23 July 1995. During the debate in parliament on the new sixth paragraph of Article 69 of the Constitution (see paragraph 45 below) the chairman of the Committee on Constitutional Questions, explained when he presented the draft it had prepared that the Constitutional Court would not restrict itself to noting the unconstitutional nature of the individual acts of the members of a party but would then be obliged to declare that the party concerned had become a centre of anti-constitutional activities on account of those acts. One MP, representing the parliamentary group of the Motherland Party (ANAP), emphasised the need to change the relevant provisions of Law no. 2820 on the regulation of political parties to take account of the new sixth paragraph of Article 69 of the Constitution.
Ultimately, Refah obtained approximately 22% of the votes in the general election of 24 December 1995 and about 35% of the votes in the local elections of 3 November 1996.
The results of the 1995 general election made Refah the largest political party in the Turkish parliament with a total of 158 seats in the Grand National Assembly (which had 450 members at the material time). On 28 June 1996 Refah came to power by forming a coalition government with the centre-right True Path Party (Dogru Yol Partisi), led by Mrs Tansu Ciller. According to an opinion poll carried out in January 1997, if a general election had been held at that time, Refah would have obtained 38% of the votes. The same poll predicted that Refah might obtain 67% of the votes in the general election to be held roughly four years later.
B. Proceedings in the Constitutional Court
1. Principal State Counsel's submissions
12. On 21 May 1997 Principal State Counsel at the Court of Cassation applied to the Turkish Constitutional Court to have Refah dissolved on the grounds that it was a “centre” (mihrak) of activities contrary to the principles of secularism. In support of his application, he referred to the following acts and remarks by certain leaders and members of Refah.
– Whenever they spoke in public Refah's chairman and other leaders advocated the wearing of Islamic headscarves in State schools and buildings occupied by public administrative authorities, whereas the Constitutional Court had already ruled that this infringed the principle of secularism enshrined in the Constitution.
– At a meeting on constitutional reform Refah's chairman, Mr Necmettin Erbakan, had made proposals tending towards the abolition of secularism in Turkey. He had suggested that the adherents of each religious movement should obey their own rules rather than the rules of Turkish law.
– On 13 April 1994 Mr Necmettin Erbakan had asked Refah's representatives in the Grand National Assembly to consider whether the change in the social order which the party sought would be “peaceful or violent” and would be achieved “harmoniously or by bloodshed”.
– At a seminar held in January 1991 in Sivas, Mr Necmettin Erbakan had called on Muslims to join Refah, saying that only his party could establish the supremacy of the Koran through a holy war (jihad) and that Muslims should therefore make donations to Refah rather than distributing alms to third parties.
– During Ramadan Mr Necmettin Erbakan had received the heads of the Islamist movements at the residence reserved for the Prime Minister, thus assuring them of his support.
– Several members of Refah, including some in high office, had made speeches calling for the secular political system to be replaced by a theocratic system. These persons had also advocated the elimination of the opponents of this policy, if necessary by force. Refah, by refusing to open disciplinary proceedings against the members concerned and even, in certain cases, facilitating the dissemination of their speeches, had tacitly approved the views expressed.
– On 8 May 1997 a Refah MP, Mr Ibrahim Halil Celik, had said in front of journalists in the corridors of the parliament building that blood would flow if an attempt was made to close the “Imam-Hatip” theological colleges, that the situation might become worse than in Algeria, that he personally wanted blood to flow so that democracy could be installed in the country, that he would strike back against anyone who attacked him and that he would fight to the end for the introduction of Islamic law (sharia).
– The Minister of Justice, Mr Sevket Kazan (a Refah MP and vice-chairman of the party), had expressed his support for the mayor of Sincan by visiting him in the prison where he had been detained pending trial after being charged with publicly vindicating international Islamist terrorist groups.
Principal State Counsel further observed that Refah had not opened any disciplinary proceedings against those responsible for the above-mentioned acts and remarks.
13. On 7 July 1997 Principal State Counsel submitted new evidence against Refah to the Constitutional Court.
2. The applicants' defence
14. On 4 August 1997 Refah's representatives filed their defence submissions, in which they relied on international human-rights-protection instruments, including the Convention, pointing out that these instruments formed part of Turkish written law. They further referred to the case-law of the Commission, which had expressed the opinion that Article 11 of the Convention had been breached in the cases concerning the United Communist Party of Turkey and the Socialist Party, and to the case-law of the Court and the Commission on the restrictions on freedom of expression and freedom of association authorised by the second paragraphs of Articles 10 and 11 of the Convention. They contended that the dissolution of Refah had not been prompted by a pressing social need and was not necessary in a democratic society. Nor, according to Refah's representatives, was their party's dissolution justified by application of the “clear and present danger” test laid down by the Supreme Court of the United States of America.
15. Refah's representatives further rejected Principal State Counsel's argument that the party was a “centre” of activities which undermined the secular nature of the Republic. They submitted that Refah was not caught by the criteria laid down in the Law on the regulation of political parties for determining whether a political party constituted a “centre of anti-constitutional activities”. They observed, inter alia, that the prosecuting authorities had not issued any warning to Refah (which had four million members) that might have enabled it to expel any of its members whose acts had contravened the provisions of the Criminal Code.
16. Refah's representatives also set out their point of view on the concept of secularism. They asserted that the principle of secularism implied respect for all beliefs and that Refah had shown such respect in its political activity.
17. The applicants' representatives alleged that in accusing Mr Necmettin Erbakan of supporting the use of force to achieve political ends and of infringing the principle of secularism the prosecuting authorities had merely cited extracts from his speeches which they had distorted and taken out of context. Moreover, these remarks were covered by Mr Necmettin Erbakan's parliamentary immunity. They further noted that the dinner he had given to senior officials of the Religious Affairs Department and former members of the theology faculty had been presented by Principal State Counsel as a reception organised for the leaders of Islamist fundamentalist movements, which had in any event been legally proscribed since 1925.
18. With regard to the remarks of the other Refah leaders and members criticised by Principal State Counsel's office, Refah's representatives observed that these did not constitute any criminal offence.
They asserted that none of the MPs whose speeches had been referred to by Principal State Counsel was authorised to represent Refah or held office within the party and claimed that the prosecuting authorities had not set in motion the procedure laid down in the Law on the regulation of political parties so as to give Refah the opportunity, if the need arose, to decide whether or not the persons concerned should continue to be members of the party; the first time Refah's leadership had been informed of the remarks criticised in the case had been when they read Principal State Counsel's submissions. The three MPs under attack had been expelled from the party, which had thus done what was necessary to avoid becoming a “centre” of illegal activities within the meaning of the Law on the regulation of political parties.
3. The parties' final submissions
19. On 5 August 1997 Principal State Counsel filed his observations on the merits of the case with the Constitutional Court. He submitted that according to the Convention and the case-law of the Turkish courts on constitutional law issues nothing obliged States to tolerate the existence of political parties that sought the destruction of democracy and the rule of law. He contended that Refah, by describing itself as an army engaged in a jihad and by openly declaring its intention to replace the Republic's statute law by sharia, had demonstrated that its objectives were incompatible with the requirements of a democratic society. Refah's aim to establish a plurality of legal systems (in which each group would be governed by a legal system in conformity with its members' religious beliefs) constituted the first stage in the process designed to substitute a theocratic regime for the Republic.
20. In their observations on the merits of the case Refah's representatives again argued that the dissolution of their party could not be grounded on any of the restrictions permitted by the second paragraph of Article 11 of the Convention. They went on to say that Article 17 of the Convention was not applicable in the case, as Refah had nothing in common with political parties which sought to install a totalitarian regime. Furthermore, the plurality of legal systems which their party proposed was actually intended to promote the freedom to enter into contracts and the freedom to choose which court should have jurisdiction.
21. On 11 November 1997 Principal State Counsel submitted his observations orally. On 18 and 20 November 1997 Mr Necmettin Erbakan submitted his oral observations on behalf of Refah.
4. The Constitutional Court's judgments
22. In a judgment of 9 January 1998, which it delivered following proceedings on preliminary issues it had instituted of its own motion as the court dealing with the merits, the Constitutional Court ruled that, regard being had to Article 69 § 6 of the Constitution, the second paragraph of section 103 of the Law on the regulation of political parties was unconstitutional and declared it null and void. Article 69 § 6, taken together with section 101(d) of the same Law, provided that for a political party to be considered a “centre” of activities contrary to the fundamental principles of the Republic its members had to have been convicted of criminal offences. According to the Constitutional Court, that legal restriction did not cover all cases where the principles of the Republic had been flouted. It pointed out, among other observations, that after the repeal of Article 163 of the Turkish Criminal Code activities contrary to the principle of secularism no longer attracted criminal penalties.
23. On 16 January 1998 the Constitutional Court dissolved Refah on the ground that it had become a “centre of activities contrary to the principle of secularism”. It based its decision on sections 101(b) and 103(1) of Law no. 2820 on the regulation of political parties. It also noted the transfer of Refah's assets to the Treasury as an automatic consequence of dissolution, in accordance with section 107 of Law no. 2820.
24. In its judgment the Constitutional Court first dismissed the preliminary objections raised by Refah. In that connection it held that the parliamentary immunity of the MPs whose remarks had been mentioned in Principal State Counsel's submissions of 21 May 1997 had nothing to do with consideration of an application for the dissolution of a political party and forfeiture of political rights by its members, but was a question of the criminal responsibility of the MPs concerned, which was not a matter of constitutional law.
25. With regard to the merits, the Constitutional Court held that while political parties were the main protagonists of democratic politics their activities were not exempt from certain restrictions. In particular, activities by them incompatible with the rule of law could not be tolerated. The Constitutional Court referred to the provisions of the Constitution which imposed respect for secularism on the various organs of political power. It also cited the numerous provisions of domestic legislation requiring political parties to apply the principle of secularism in a number of fields of political and social life. The Constitutional Court observed that secularism was one of the indispensable conditions of democracy. In Turkey the principle of secularism was safeguarded by the Constitution, on account of the country's historical experience and the specific features of Islam. The rules of sharia were incompatible with the democratic regime. The principle of secularism prevented the State from manifesting a preference for a particular religion or belief and constituted the foundation of freedom of conscience and equality between citizens before the law. Intervention by the State to preserve the secular nature of the political regime had to be considered necessary in a democratic society.
26. The Constitutional Court held that the following evidence proved that Refah had become a centre of activities contrary to the principle of secularism (see paragraphs 27 to 39 below):
27. Refah's chairman, Mr Necmettin Erbakan, had encouraged the wearing of Islamic headscarves in public and educational establishments. On 10 October 1993, at the party's Fourth Ordinary General Meeting, he had said:
“... when we were in government, for four years, the notorious Article 163 of the Persecution Code was never applied against any child in the country. In our time there was never any question of hostility to the wearing of headscarves...”
In his speech of 14 December 1995 before the general election he had said:
“... [university] chancellors are going to retreat before the headscarf when Refah comes to power”.
But manifesting one's religion in such a manner amounted to exerting pressure on persons who did not follow that practice and created discrimination on the ground of religion or beliefs. That finding was supported by various rulings of the Constitutional Court and the Supreme Administrative Court and by the case-law of the European Commission of Human Rights on applications nos. 16278/90 and 18783/91 concerning the wearing of headscarves at universities.
28. The plurality of legal systems proposed by Mr Necmettin Erbakan was nothing to do with the freedom to enter into contracts as Refah claimed, but was an attempt to establish a distinction between citizens on the ground of their religion and beliefs and was aimed at the installation of a theocratic regime. On 23 March 1993 Mr Erbakan had made the following speech to the National Assembly:
“... 'you shall live in a manner compatible with your beliefs'. We want despotism to be abolished. There must be several legal systems. The citizen must be able to choose for himself which legal system is most appropriate for him, within a framework of general principles. Moreover, that has always been the case throughout our history. In our history there have been various religious movements. Everyone lived according to the legal rules of his own organisation, and so everyone lived in peace. Why, then, should I be obliged to live according to another's rules? ... The right to choose one's own legal system is an integral part of the freedom of religion.”
In addition, Mr Necmettin Erbakan had spoken as follows on 10 October 1993 at a Refah party conference:
“... we shall guarantee all human rights. We shall guarantee to everyone the right to live as he sees fit and to choose the legal system he prefers. We shall free the administration from centralism. The State which you have installed is a repressive State, not a State at the people's service. You do not allow the freedom to choose one's code of law. When we are in power a Muslim will be able to get married before the mufti, if he wishes, and a Christian will be able to marry in church, if he prefers.”
29. The plurality of legal systems advocated by Mr Necmettin Erbakan in his speeches had its origin in the practice introduced in the first years of Islam by the “Medina Agreement”, which had given the Jewish and polytheist communities the right to live according to their own legal systems, not according to Islamic law. On the basis of the Medina Agreement some Islamist thinkers and politicians had proposed a model of peaceful social co-existence under which each religious group would be free to choose its own legal system. Since the foundation of the Nizam party in 1970 (dissolved by the Decree of 2 May 1971) Mr Necmettin Erbakan had been seeking to replace the single legal system with a plurality of legal systems.
30. The Constitutional Court further observed that in a plurality of legal systems, as proposed by Refah, society would have to be divided into several religious movements; each individual would have to choose the movement to which he wished to belong and would thus be subjected to the rights and obligations prescribed by the religion of his community. The Constitutional Court pointed out that such a system, whose origins lay in the history of Islam as a political regime, was inimical to the consciousness of allegiance to a nation having legislative and judicial unity. It would naturally impair judicial unity since each religious movement would set up its own courts and the ordinary courts would be obliged to apply the law according to the religion of those appearing before them, thus obliging the latter to reveal their beliefs. It would also undermine legislative and judicial unity, the preconditions for secularism and the consciousness of nationhood, given that each religious movement would be empowered to decree what legal rules should be applicable to its members.
31. In addition, Mr Necmettin Erbakan had made a speech on 13 April 1994 to the Refah group in parliament in which he had advocated setting up a theocratic regime, if necessary through force:
“The second important point is this: Refah will come to power and a just [social] order (adil duzen) will be established. The question we must ask ourselves is whether this change will be violent or peaceful; whether it will entail bloodshed. I would have preferred not to have to use those terms, but in the face of all that, in the face of terrorism, and so that everyone can see the true situation clearly, I feel obliged to do so. Today Turkey must take a decision. The Welfare Party will establish a just order, that is certain. [But] will the transition be peaceful or violent; will it be achieved harmoniously or by bloodshed? The sixty million [citizens] must make up their minds on that point.”
32. The reception given by Mr Necmettin Erbakan at the Prime Minister's residence to the leaders of various religious movements, who had attended in vestments denoting their religious allegiance, unambiguously evidenced Refah's chairman's support for these religious groups vis-a-vis public opinion.
33. In a public speech in April 1994 Mr Sevki Y?lmaz, MP for the province of Rize, had issued a clear call to wage a holy war (jihad) and had argued for the introduction of Islamic law, making the following declaration:
“We shall certainly call to account those who turn their backs on the precepts of the Koran and those who deprive Allah's messenger of his jurisdiction in their country.”
In another public speech, also in April 1994, Mr Sevki Y?lmaz had said:
“In the hereafter you will be summoned with the leaders you have chosen in this life. ... Have you considered to what extent the Koran is applied in this country? I have done the sums. Only 39% [of the rules] in the Koran are applied in this country. Six thousand five hundred verses have been quietly forgotten ... You found a Koranic school, you build a hostel, you pay for a child's education, you teach, you preach. ... None of that is part of the chapter on jihad but of that on the amel-i salih (peacetime activities). Jihad is the name given to the quest for power for the advent of justice, for the propagation of justice and for glorification of Allah's Word. Allah did not see that task as an abstract political concept; he made it a requirement for warriors (cahudi). What does that mean? That jihad must be waged by an army! The commander is identified... The condition to be met before prayer (namaz) is the Islamisation of power. Allah says that, before mosques, it is the path of power which must be Muslim... It is not erecting vaulted ceilings in the places of prayer which will lead you to Paradise. For Allah does not ask whether you have built up vaulted ceilings in this country. He will not ask that. He will ask you if you have reached a sufficient level ... today, if Muslims have a hundred liras, they must give thirty to the Koranic schools, to train our children, girls and boys, and sixty must be given to the political establishments which open the road to power. Allah asked all his prophets to fight for power. You cannot name a single member of a religious movement who does not fight for power. I tell you, if I had as many heads as I have hairs on my head, even if each of those heads were to be torn from my shoulders for following the way of the Koran, I would not abandon my cause... The question Allah will ask you is this: 'Why, in the time of the blasphemous regime, did you not work for the construction of an Islamic State?' Erbakan and his friends want to bring Islam to this country in the form of a political party. The prosecutor understood that clearly. If we could understand that as he did, the problem would be solved. Even Abraham the Jew has realised that in this country the symbol of Islam is Refah. He who incites the Muslim community (cemaat) to take up arms before political power is in Muslim hands is a fool, or a traitor doing the bidding of others. For none of the prophets authorised war before the capture of State power. ... Muslims are intelligent. They do not reveal how they intend to beat their enemy. The general staff gives orders and the soldiers obey. If the general staff reveals its plan, it is up to the commanders of the Muslim community to make a new plan. Our mission is not to talk, but to apply the war plan, as soldiers in the army...”
Criminal proceedings had been brought against Mr Sevki Y?lmaz. Although his antipathy to secularism was well-known, Refah had adopted him as a candidate in local-government elections. After he had been elected mayor of Rize, Refah had made sure that he was elected as an MP in the Turkish Grand National Assembly.
34. In a public speech on 14 March 1993 and a television interview first recorded in 1992 and rebroadcast on 24 November 1996, Mr Hasan Huseyin Ceylan, Refah MP for the province of Ankara, had encouraged discrimination between believers and non-believers and had predicted that if the supporters of applying sharia came to power they would annihilate non-believers:
“Our homeland belongs to us, but not the regime, dear brothers. The regime and Kemalism belong to others. ... Turkey will be destroyed, gentlemen. People say: Could Turkey become like Algeria? Just as, in Algeria, we got 81% [of the votes], here too we will reach 81%, we will not remain on 20%. Do not waste your energy on us – I am speaking here to you, to those ... of the imperialist West, the colonising West, the wild West, to those who, in order to unite with the rest of the world, become the enemies of honour and modesty, those who lower themselves to the level of dogs, of puppies, in order to imitate the West, to the extent of putting dogs between the legs of Muslim women – it is to you I speak when I say: 'Do not waste your energy on us, you will die at the hands of the people of K?r?kkale.'”.
“... the army says: 'We can accept it if you're a supporter of the PKK, but a supporter of sharia, never.' Well you won't solve the problem with that attitude. If you want the solution, it's sharia.”
Refah had ensured that Ceylan was elected as an MP and its local branches had played videotapes of this speech and the interview.
35. Refah's vice-chairman, Mr Ahmet Tekdal, in a speech he made in 1993 while on pilgrimage in Saudi Arabia which was shown by a Turkish television station, had said that he advocated installing a regime based on sharia:
“In countries which have a parliamentary regime, if the people are not sufficiently aware, if they do not work hard enough to bring about the advent of 'hak nizami' [a just order or God's order], two calamities lie ahead. The first calamity is the renegades they will have to face. They will be tyrannised by them and will eventually disappear. The second calamity is that they will not be able to give a satisfactory account of themselves to Allah, as they will not have worked to establish 'hak nizami'. And so they will likewise perish. Venerable brothers, our duty is to do what is necessary to introduce the system of justice, taking these subtleties into consideration. The political apparatus which seeks to establish 'hak nizami' in Turkey is the Welfare Party.”
36. On 10 November 1996 the mayor of Kayseri, Mr Sukru Karatepe, had urged the population to renounce secularism and asked his audience to “keep their hatred alive” until the regime was changed, in the following terms:
“The dominant forces say 'either you live as we do or we will sow discord and corruption among you'. So even Welfare Party Ministers dare not reveal their world-outlook inside their Ministries. This morning I too attended a ceremony in my official capacity. When you see me dressed up like this in all this finery, don't think it's because I'm a supporter of secularism. In this period when our beliefs are not respected, and indeed are blasphemed against, I have had to attend these ceremonies in spite of myself. The Prime Minister, other Ministers and MPs have certain obligations. But you have no obligations. This system must change. We have waited, we will wait a little longer. Let us see what the future has in store for us. And let Muslims keep alive the resentment, rancour and hatred they feel in their hearts.”
Mr Sukru Karatepe had been convicted of inciting the people to hatred on the ground of religion.
37. On 8 May 1997 Mr Ibrahim Halil Celik, Refah MP for the province of Sanl?urfa, had spoken in parliament in favour of the establishment of a regime based on sharia and approving acts of violence like those which were taking place in Algeria:
“If you attempt to close down the “Imam-Hatip” theological colleges while the Welfare Party is in government, blood will flow. It would be worse than in Algeria. I too would like blood to flow. That's how democracy will be installed. And it will be a beautiful thing. The army has not been able to deal with 3,500 members of the PKK. How would it see off six million Islamists? If they piss into the wind they'll get their faces wet. If anyone attacks me I will strike back. I will fight to the end to introduce sharia.”
Mr Ibrahim Halil Celik had been expelled from the party one month after the application for dissolution had been lodged. His exclusion had probably only been an attempt to evade the penalty in question.
38. Refah's vice-chairman, the Minister of Justice, Mr Sevket Kazan, had visited a person detained pending trial for activities contrary to the principle of secularism, thus publicly lending him his support as a Minister.
39. On the basis of the evidence adduced on 7 July 1997 by Principal State Counsel's office, the Constitutional Court held that the following further evidence confirmed that Refah was a centre of activities contrary to the principle of secularism:
- In a public speech on 7 May 1996 Mr Necmettin Erbakan had emphasised the importance of television as an instrument of propaganda in the holy war being waged in order to establish Islamic order:
“... A State without television is not a State. If today, with your leadership, you wished to create a State, if you wanted to set up a television station, you would not even be able to broadcast for more than twenty-four hours. Do you believe it is as easy as that to create a State? That's what I told them ten years ago. I remember it now. Because today people who have beliefs, an audience and a certain vision of the world, have a television station of their own, thanks be to God. It is a great event.
Conscience, the fact that the television [channel] has the same conscience in all its programmes, and that the whole is harmonious, is very important. A cause cannot be fought for without [the support of] television. Besides, today we can say that television plays the role of artillery or an air force in the jihad, that is the war for domination of the people ... it would be unthinkable to send a soldier to occupy a hill before those forces had shelled or bombed it. That is why the jihad of today cannot be waged without television. So, for something so vital, sacrifices must be made. What difference does it make if we sacrifice money? Death is close to all of us. When everything is black, after death, if you want something to show you the way, that something is the money you give today, with conviction, for Channel 7 (Kanal 7). It was to remind you of that that I shared my memories with you.
... That is why, from now on, with that conviction, we will truly make every sacrifice, until it hurts. May those who contribute, with conviction, to the supremacy of Hakk [Allah] be happy. May Allah bless you all, and may He grant Kanal 7 even more success. Greetings.”
- By a decree of 13 January 1997 the cabinet (in which the Refah members formed a majority) had reorganised working hours in public establishments to make allowances for fasting during Ramadan. The Supreme Administrative Court had annulled this decree on the ground that it undermined the principle of secularism.
40. The Constitutional Court observed that it had taken into consideration international human-rights-protection instruments, including the Convention. It also referred to the restrictions authorised by the second paragraph of Article 11 and Article 17 of the Convention. It pointed out in that context that Refah's leaders and members were using democratic rights and freedoms with a view to replacing the democratic order with a system based on sharia. The Constitutional Court observed:
“Democracy is the antithesis of sharia. [The] principle [of secularism], which is a sign of civic responsibility, was the impetus which enabled the Turkish Republic to move on from Ummah [ummet – the Muslim religious community] to the nation. With adherence to to the principle of secularism, values based on reason and science replaced dogmatic values. ... Persons of different beliefs, desiring to live together, were encouraged to do so by the State's egalitarian attitude towards them. ... Secularism accelerated civilisation by preventing religion from replacing scientific thought in the State's activities. It creates a vast environment of civic responsibility and freedom. The philosophy of modernisation of Turkey is based on a humanist ideal, namely living in a more human way. Under a secular regime religion, which is a specific social institution, can have no authority over the constitution and governance of the State. ... Conferring on the State the right to supervise and oversee religious matters cannot be regarded as interference contrary to the requirements of democratic society. ... Secularism, which is also the instrument of the transition to democracy, is the philosophocal essence of life in Turkey. Within a secular State religious feelings simply cannot be associated with politics, public affairs and legislative provisions. Those are not matters to which religious requirements and thought apply, only scientific data, with consideration for the needs of individuals and societies.”
The Constitutional Court held that where a political party pursued activities aimed at bringing the democratic order to an end and used its freedom of expression to issue calls to action to achieve that aim, the Constitution and supranational human-rights-protection rules authorised its dissolution.
41. The Constitutional Court observed that the public statements of Refah's leaders, namely those of Mr Necmettin Erbakan, Mr Sevket Kazan and Mr Ahmet Tekdal, had directly engaged Refah's responsibility with regard to the constitutionality of its activities. It further observed that the public statements made by MPs Mr Sevki Y?lmaz, Mr Hasan Huseyin Ceylan and Mr Ibrahim Halil Celik, and by the mayor of Kayseri, Mr Sukru Karatepe, had likewise engaged the party's responsibility since it had not reacted to them in any way or sought to distance itself from them, or at least not before the commencement of the dissolution proceedings.
42. As an additional penalty, the Constitutional Court decided to strip Necmettin Erbakan, Sevket Kazan, Ahmet Tekdal, Sevki Y?lmaz, Hasan Huseyin Ceylan and Ibrahim Halil Celik of MP status, in accordance with Article 84 of the Constitution. It found that these persons, by their words and deeds, had caused Refah's dissolution. The Constitutional Court also banned them for five years from becoming founder members, ordinary members, leaders or auditors of any other political party, pursuant to Article 69 § 8 of the Constitution.
43. Judges Hasim K?l?c and Sacit Adal? expressed dissenting opinions stating, inter alia, that in their view the dissolution of Refah was not compatible either with the provisions of the Convention or with the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights on the dissolution of political parties. They observed that political parties which did not support the use of violence should be able to take part in political life and that in a pluralist system there should be room for debate about ideas thought to be disturbing or even shocking.
44. This judgment was published in the Official Gazette on 22 February 1998.
II. RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW
A. The Constitution
45. The relevant provisions of the Constitution read as follows:
Article 2
“The Republic of Turkey is a democratic, secular and social State based on the rule of law, respectful of human rights in a spirit of social peace, national solidarity and justice, adhering to the nationalism of Ataturk and resting on the fundamental principles set out in the Preamble.”
Article 4
“No amendment may be made or proposed to the provisions of Article 1 of the Constitution providing that the State shall be a republic, the provisions of Article 2 concerning the characteristics of the Republic or the provisions of Article 3.”
Article 6
“Sovereignty resides unconditionally and unreservedly in the nation. ... Sovereign power shall not under any circumstances be delegated to an individual, a group or a social class. ...”
Article 10 § 1
“All individuals shall be equal before the law without any distinction based on language, race, colour, sex, political opinion, philosophical beliefs, religion, membership of a religious sect or other similar grounds.”
Article 14 § 1
“None of the rights and freedoms referred to in the Constitution shall be exercised with a view to undermining the territorial integrity of the State and the unity of the nation, jeopardising the existence of the Turkish State or Republic, abolishing fundamental rights and freedoms, placing the control of the State in the hands of a single individual or group, ensuring the domination of one social class over other social classes, introducing discrimination on the grounds of language, race, religion or membership of a religious organisation, or establishing by any other means a State political system based on such concepts and opinions.”
Article 24 § 4
“No one may exploit or abuse religion, religious feelings or things held sacred by religion in any manner whatsoever with a view to causing the social, economic, political or legal order of the State to be based on religious precepts, even if only in part, or for the purpose of securing political or personal interest or influence thereby.”
Article 68 § 4
“The constitutions, rulebooks and activities of political parties shall not be incompatible with the independence of the State, the integrity of State territory and of the nation, human rights, the principles of equality and the rule of law, national sovereignty or the principles of a democratic, secular republic. No political party may be founded with the aim of advocating and establishing the domination of one social class or group, or a dictatorship in any form whatsoever. ...”
Article 69 § 4
“... The Constitutional Court shall give a final ruling on the dissolution of political parties on an application by Principal State Counsel at the Court of Cassation.”
Article 69 § 6
“... A political party may not be dissolved on account of activities contrary to the provisions of Article 68 § 4 unless the Constitutional Court has held that the political party concerned constitutes a centre of such activities.”
This provision of the Constitution was added on 23 July 1995.
Article 69 § 8
“... Members and leaders whose declarations and activities lead to the dissolution of a political party may not be founder members, leaders or auditors of another political party for a period of five years from the date on which the reasoned decision to dissolve the party is published in the Official Gazette...”
Article 84
“Forfeiture of the status of member
Where the Council of the Presidency of the Grand National Assembly has validated the resignation of members of parliament, the loss of their status as members shall be decided by the Grand National Assembly in plenary session.
A convicted member of parliament shall not forfeit the status of member until the court which convicted him has notified the plenary Assembly of the final judgment.
A member of parliament who continues to hold an office or carry on an activity incompatible with the status of member, within the meaning of Article 82, shall forfeit that status after a secret ballot of the plenary Assembly held in the light of the relevant committee's report showing that the member concerned holds or carries on the office or activity in question.
Where the Council of the Presidency of the Grand National Assembly notes that a member of parliament, without valid authorisation or excuse, has failed, for a total of five days in one month, to take part in the work of the Assembly, that member shall forfeit the status of member where by majority vote the plenary Assembly so decides.
The term of office of a member of parliament whose words and deeds have, according to the Constitutional Court's judgment, led to the dissolution of his party, shall end on the date when that judgment is published in the Official Gazette. The Presidency of the Grand National Assembly shall enforce that part of the judgment and inform the plenary Assembly accordingly.”
B. Law no. 2820 on the regulation of political parties
46. The relevant provisions of Law no. 2820 read as follows:
Section 78
“Political parties
(a) shall not aim or strive to or incite third parties to ... jeopardise the existence of the Turkish State and Republic, abolish fundamental rights and freedoms, introduce discrimination on grounds of language, race, colour, religion or membership of a religious sect, or establish, by any means, a system of government based on any such notion or concept. ...”
Section 90(1)
“The constitution, programme and activities of political parties shall not contravene the Constitution or this Law.”
Section 101
“The Constitutional Court shall dissolve a political party
...
(b) where its general meeting, central office or executive committee ... takes a decision, issues a circular or makes a statement ... contrary to the provisions of Chapter 4 of this Law 1, or where the Chairman, Vice-Chairman or General Secretary makes any written or oral statement contrary to those provisions.
[Note 1: This chapter (from section 78 to section 97), which concerns restrictions on the activities of political parties, provides, inter alia, that such activities may not be conducted to the detriment of the democratic constitutional order (including the sovereignty of the people and free elections), the nature of the nation State (including national independence, national unity and the principle of equality), and the secular nature of the State (including observance of the reforms carried out by Ataturk, the prohibition on exploiting religious feelings and the prohibition on religious demonstrations organised by political parties).]
...
(d) Where acts contrary to the provisions of Chapter 4 of this Law have been committed by organs, authorities or councils other than those mentioned in sub-section I(b), State Counsel shall, within two years of the act concerned, require the party in writing to disband those organs and/or authorities and/or councils. State Counsel shall order the permanent exclusion from the party of those members who have been convicted for committing acts or making statements which contravene the provisions of Part 4.
State counsel shall institute proceedings for the dissolution of any political party which fails to comply with the instructions in his letter within thirty days of its service. If, within thirty days of service of State Counsel's application, the organs, authorities or councils concerned have been disbanded by the party, and the member or members in question have been permanently excluded, the dissolution proceedings shall lapse. If not, the Constitutional Court shall consider the case on the basis of the file and shall adjudicate after hearing, if necessary, the oral submissions of State Counsel, the representatives of the political party and all those capable of providing information about the case...”
Section 103
“Where it is found that a political party has become a centre of activities contrary to the provisions of sections 78 to 88 ... of the present Law, the party shall be dissolved by the Constitutional Court.”
Section 107(1)
“All the assets of political parties dissolved by order of the Constitutional Court shall be transferred to the Treasury.”
47. Paragraph 2 of section 103, which the Constitutional Court declared unconstitutional on 9 January 1998, prescribed the use of the procedure laid down in section 101 (d) for determination of the question whether a political party had become a centre of anti-constitutional activities.
C. Article 163 of the Criminal Code, repealed on 12 April 1991
48. This provision was worded as follows:
“It shall be an offence, punishable by eight to fifteen years' imprisonment, to establish, found, organise, regulate, direct or administer associations with the intention of adapting the fundamental legal, social, economic or political bases of the State, even in part, to religious beliefs.
It shall be an offence, punishable by five to twelve years' imprisonment, to be a member of an association of that type or to incite another to become a member.
It shall be an offence, punishable by five to ten years' imprisonment, to spread propaganda in any form or to attempt to acquire influence by exploiting religion, religious feelings or objects regarded as sacred by religion in a manner contrary to the principle of secularism and with the intention of adapting the fundamental legal, social, economic or political bases of the State, even in part, to religious beliefs or of serving political interests.
It shall be an offence, punishable by two to five years' imprisonment, to spread propaganda in any form or to attempt to acquire influence, with the aim of serving one's personal interests or obtaining advantages, by exploiting religion, religious feelings, objects regarded as sacred by religion or religious books.
Where the acts mentioned above are committed on the premises of the public administrative authorities, municipal councils, publicly-owned undertakings whose capital, or part of whose capital, belongs to the State, trade unions, workers' organisations, schools, or institutions of higher education, or by civil servants, technicians, doorkeepers or members of such establishments, the penalty shall be increased by a third.
Where the acts mentioned in the third and fourth paragraphs above are committed by means of publications, the penalty shall be increased by a half.”
THE LAW
I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 11 OF THE CONVENTION
49. The applicants alleged that the dissolution of Refah Partisi (The Welfare Party) and the temporary prohibition barring its leaders – including Mr Necmettin Erbakan, Mr Sevket Kazan and Mr Ahmet Tekdal – from holding similar office in any other political party had infringed their right to freedom of association, guaranteed by Article 11 of the Convention, the relevant parts of which provide:
“1. Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and to freedom of association...
2. No restrictions shall be placed on the exercise of these rights other than such as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others...”
A. Whether there was an interference
50. The parties accepted that Refah's dissolution and the measures which accompanied it amounted to an interference with the applicants' exercise of their right to freedom of association. The Court takes the same view.
B. Whether the interference was justified
51. Such an interference will constitute a breach of Article 11 unless it was “prescribed by law”, pursued one or more of the legitimate aims set out in paragraph 2 of that provision and was “necessary in a democratic society” for the achievement of those aims.
1. “Prescribed by law”
(a) Arguments of the parties
(i) The applicants
52. The applicants submitted that the criteria applied by the Constitutional Court in establishing that Refah had become a centre of anti-constitutional activities were broader than those laid down by Law no. 2820 on the regulation of political parties. The provisions of Law no. 2820, which laid down stricter criteria in the matter, namely those concerning refusal to expel members who had been convicted of criminal offences, had been declared void by a decision of the Constitutional Court one week before its decision to dissolve Refah. Moreover, the former decision had been published in the Official Gazette after Refah's dissolution.
53. The applicants argued that all of the above had made it impossible to foresee what criteria the Constitutional Court would apply in deciding that Refah had become a centre of anti-constitutional activities. The new version of Law no. 2820 had not been accessible to the applicants before Refah's dissolution. They could not have been expected to organise their political activities in accordance with criteria that did not exist before the party's dissolution. The applicants submitted that the former version of Law no. 2820 should have been applied in their case and that, after Refah's exclusion of its members whose speeches had been cited by Principal State Counsel in his submissions, the Constitutional Court should have discontinued the dissolution proceedings.
(ii) The Government
54. The Government asked the Court to reject the applicants' arguments. They observed that the interference in question was clearly prescribed by Articles 68 and 69 of the Constitution, which required political parties constituting centres of anti-constitutional activities, contrary to the principles of equality and of a secular, democratic republic in particular, to be dissolved by the Constitutional Court. They emphasised that one of the conditions for the dissolution of a political party, namely failure on its part to expel those of its members who had been convicted of criminal offences – a condition which had been added by the Law on the regulation of political parties to the definition of a “centre of anti-constitutional activities” – was no longer applicable in the case on account of changes to the Criminal Code. In other words, following the repeal of Article 163 of the Turkish Criminal Code, which concerned the dissemination of anti-secular ideas and the creation of associations for that purpose, the procedure laid down in section 103(2) of the Law on the regulation of political parties had become devoid of purpose. The Government submitted that for that reason section 103(2) was manifestly unconstitutional in that its application would have made it impossible to give full effect to the Constitution, and in particular Article 69 § 6 thereof, which gave the Constitutional Court sole power to rule that a political party constituted a centre of anti-constitutional activities.
55. The Government further submitted that a judgment concerning a review of the constitutionality of the specific rule to be applied in a particular dispute did not need to be published in the Official Gazette before the commencement of that dispute in order to be operative. In such a situation the Constitutional Court adjourned the proceedings until it had settled the question of the constitutionality of a legislative provision it had to apply. That procedure was a well-established practice of the Turkish Constitutional Court and of the higher courts in a number of other European countries.
(b) The Court's assessment
56. The Court must first consider whether the applicants are estopped from submitting this argument, since they accepted in their additional observations to the Chamber and at the hearing before the Chamber that the measures complained of were in accordance with domestic law, and in particular with the Constitution. In its judgment the Chamber noted that the parties agreed “that the interference concerned was 'prescribed by law', the measures imposed by the Constitutional Court being based on Articles 68, 69 and 84 of the Constitution and sections 101 and 107 of Law no. 2820 on the regulation of political parties”.
However, the Court points out that the “case” referred to the Grand Chamber embraces in principle all aspects of the application previously examined by the Chamber in its judgment, the scope of its jurisdiction in the “case” being limited only by the Chamber's decision on admissibility. It does not exclude the possibility of estoppel where one of the parties breaks good faith through a radical change of position. However, that has not occurred in the instant case, as the applicants presented in their initial applications the main lines of their argument on this point. They are therefore not estopped from raising the issue now (see, mutatis mutandis, K. and T. v. Finland [GC], no. 25702/94, ECHR 2001-VII, §§ 139-41; Kingsley v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 35605/97, ECHR 2002-IV, § 34; and Goc v. Turkey, [GC], no. 36590/97, ECHR 2002-.., §§ 35-37).
57. As regards the accessibility of the provisions in issue and the foreseeability of their effects, the Court reiterates that the expression “prescribed by law” requires firstly that the impugned measure should have a basis in domestic law. It also refers to the quality of the law in question, requiring that it be accessible to the persons concerned and formulated with sufficient precision to enable them - if need be, with appropriate advice - to foresee, to a degree that is reasonable in the circumstances, the consequences which a given action may entail. Experience shows, however, that it is impossible to attain absolute precision in the framing of laws, particularly in fields in which the situation changes according to the evolving views of society. A law which confers a discretion is not in itself inconsistent with this requirement, provided that the scope of the discretion and the manner of its exercise are indicated with sufficient clarity, having regard to the legitimate aim in question, to give the individual adequate protection against arbitrary interference (see Muller and Others v. Switzerland, 24 May 1988, Series A no. 133, p. 20, § 29; Ezelin v. France, 26 April 1991, Series A no. 202, pp. 21-22, § 45; and Margareta and Roger Andersson v. Sweden, 25 February 1992, Series A no. 226-A, p. 25, § 75). The Court also accepts that the level of precision required of domestic legislation – which cannot in any case provide for every eventuality – depends to a considerable degree on the content of the instrument in question, the field it is designed to cover and the status of those to whom it is addressed. It is, moreover, primarily for the national authorities to interpret and apply domestic law (see Vogt v. Germany, 26 September 1995, Series A no. 323, p. 24, § 48).
58. In the instant case the Court observes that the dispute under domestic law concerned the constitutionality of the activities of a political party and fell within the jurisdiction of the Constitutional Court. The written law most relevant to the question whether the interference was “prescribed by law” is the Turkish Constitution.
59. The parties did not dispute that activities contrary to the principles of equality and respect for the democratic, secular republic were undoubtedly unconstitutional under Article 68 of the Constitution. Nor did they deny that the Constitutional Court had sole jurisdiction, on an application by Principal State Counsel, to dissolve a political party which had become a centre of activities contrary to Article 68 of the Constitution. Moreover, Article 69 of the Constitution (amended in 1995) explicitly confirms that the Constitutional Court alone is empowered to determine whether a political party constitutes a centre of anti-constitutional activities. The Court notes that Refah's MPs took part in the work of the parliamentary committee concerned and the debate in the Grand National Assembly on the 1995 amendments to the Constitution (see paragraph 11 above).
60. Furthermore, the fact that on 12 April 1991 anti-secular activities ceased to be punishable under the criminal law is not disputed by either party. The Court notes that, as the Turkish Constitutional Court explained in its judgment of 9 January 1998, there thus resulted a divergence between the Law on the regulation of political parties and the Constitution, in that the requirement in section 103(2) of the Law on the regulation of political parties that in order for the political party concerned to constitute a “centre of anti-constitutional activities” it had to have refused to expel those of its members who had been convicted of criminal offences, taken together with the amendments to the Criminal Code of 12 April 1991, had rendered meaningless the Constitutional Court's power to dissolve political parties which constituted centres of anti-secular activities, even though that power was clearly conferred by Articles 68 § 4 and 69 §§ 4 and 6 of the Constitution.
61. It remains to be determined whether the applicants must have been aware of the possibility of a direct application of the Constitution in their case and could thus have foreseen the risks they ran through their party's anti-secular activities or through their refusal to distance themselves from that type of activity, without the procedure laid down by section 103(2) of the Law on the regulation of political parties being followed.
In order to be able to answer that question, the Court must first consider the relevant particularities of the legal background against which the facts of the case took place, as set out in the judgment of the Turkish Constitutional Court and not contested by the parties. The Turkish Constitution cannot be amended by ordinary legislation and takes precedence over statute law; a conflict between the Constitution's provisions and those of ordinary legislation is resolved in the Constitution's favour. In addition, the Constitutional Court has the power and the duty to review the constitutionality of legislation. Where in a particular case there is a discrepancy between the provisions of the applicable statute law and those of the Constitution, as happened in the instant case, the Constitutional Court is clearly required to give precedence to the provisions of the Constitution, disregarding the unconstitutional provisions of the relevant legislation.
62. The Court next takes into account the applicants' status as the persons to whom the relevant legal instruments were addressed. Refah was a large political party which had legal advisers conversant with constitutional law and the rules governing political parties. Mr Necmettin Erbakan, Mr Sevket Kazan and Mr Ahmet Tekdal were also experienced politicians. As members of the Turkish parliament they had taken part in parliamentary discussions and procedures concerning the amendments to the Constitution, during which the Constitutional Court's power to rule that a party had become a centre of anti-constitutional activities and the discrepancy between the new text of the Constitution and Law no. 2820 were mentioned. In addition, Mr Sevket Kazan and Mr Ahmet Tekdal were lawyers by profession (see paragraphs 10 and 11 above).
63. That being so, the Court considers that the applicants were reasonably able to foresee that they ran the risk of proceedings to dissolve Refah if the party's leaders and members engaged in anti-secular activities, and that the fact that the steps laid down in section 103(2) of Law no. 2820 were not taken, having become inapplicable as a result of the 1991 changes to the Criminal Code's provisions on anti-secular activities, could not prevent implementation of the dissolution procedure required by the Turkish Constitution.
64. Consequently, the interference was “prescribed by law”.
2. Legitimate aim
65. The Government submitted that the interference complained of pursued several legitimate aims, namely protection of public safety, national security and the rights and freedoms of others and the prevention of crime.
66. The applicants accepted in principle that protection of public safety and the rights and freedoms of others and the prevention of crime might depend on safeguarding the principle of secularism. However, they submitted that in pleading those aims the Government sought to conceal the underlying reasons which had led to Refah's dissolution. In reality, they argued, this had been the aim of major business concerns and the military, whose interests were threatened by Refah's economic policy, involving a reduction of the national debt to zero.
67. The Court considers that the applicants have not adduced sufficient evidence to establish that Refah was dissolved for reasons other than those cited by the Constitutional Court. Taking into account the importance of the principle of secularism for the democratic system in Turkey, it considers that Refah's dissolution pursued several of the legitimate aims listed in Article 11, namely protection of national security and public safety, prevention of disorder or crime and protection of the rights and freedoms of others.
3. “Necessary in a democratic society”
(a) Arguments of the parties
(i) The applicants
68. The applicants submitted in the first place that the criticisms that had been levelled at Refah on the basis of speeches made several years before were not nearly sufficient to prove that the party constituted a threat to secularism and democracy in Turkey at the time when the dissolution proceedings were instituted against it.
69. They further observed that Refah had found itself in power thirteen years after its foundation. With its millions of members it had had a long political existence and had taken on many responsibilities in local and central government. In order to determine whether the party's dissolution was necessary, the Court should assess all the factors that had led to the decision and all of the party's activities since it had come into existence.
70. The applicants further emphasised the fact that Refah had been in power for a year, from June 1996 to July 1997, during which time it could have tabled draft legislation to introduce a regime based on Islamic law. But it had done nothing of the sort. The applicants submitted that “rigorous” European supervision on the Court's part would have shown that Refah complied with democratic principles.
71. As regards the imputability to Refah of the statements and acts cited in the dissolution judgment, the applicants maintained that where these acts and speeches were attributable to members who had been expelled from the party for that very reason they could not engage Refah's responsibility. The remarks of Refah's chairman, Mr Necmettin Erbakan, had to be interpreted in context, in the light of the full text of the speeches from which they had been extracted. No apologia for violence could be discerned in those speeches.
72. With regard to the theory of a plurality of legal systems, the applicants pointed out that Mr Necmettin Erbakan's speeches on that point were isolated and had been made in 1993. It was not the policy of Refah, as a political party, to introduce a plurality of legal systems, but at all events what Mr Necmettin Erbakan had proposed was only the introduction of a “civil-law” system, based on the freedom to enter into contracts, which would not have affected the general sphere of public law. Frustrating such a policy in the name of the special role of secularism in Turkey amounted to discrimination against Muslims who wished to conduct their private lives in accordance with the precepts of their religion.
73. On the question whether Refah sought to introduce a regime based on sharia, the applicants observed in the first place that there was no reference in Refah's constitution or its programme to either sharia or Islam. Secondly, they submitted that analysis of the speeches made by Refah's leaders did not establish that it was the party's policy to introduce sharia in Turkey. The desire to see sharia introduced in Turkey, as expressed by certain MPs who had subsequently been expelled from Refah, could not be attributed to the party as a whole. In any case, the proposal to introduce sharia and the plan to establish a plurality of legal systems were incompatible, and the Constitutional Court had been mistaken in accusing Refah of supporting both proposals simultaneously.
74. Moreover, in the applicants' submission, the concept of a “just order”, which had been mentioned in certain speeches by party members, was not a reference to divine order, contrary to what had been stated in the Chamber's judgment. Many theoreticians had used the same term in order to describe their ideal society without giving it any religious connotation.
75. The applicants further disputed the statement in paragraph 72 of the Chamber's judgment that “It is difficult to declare one's respect for democracy and human rights while at the same time supporting a regime based on sharia. ...”. They submitted that such a statement could lead to a distinction between “Christian-democrats” and “Muslim-democrats” and constitute discrimination against the 150 million Muslims in a total European population of 800 million. In any event, they considered that the question did not fall within the Court's jurisdiction.
76. As regards recourse to force, the applicants maintained that even though some Refah members had mentioned such a possibility in their speeches, no member of Refah had ever attempted to use force. The inescapable conclusion was that the acts and speeches criticised on this account did not at the time of the party's dissolution represent a real danger for secularism in Turkey. Certain members who had made such speeches had been expelled from Refah. One of them had been convicted just before the dissolution, so that Refah had not had time to expel him before being dissolved. The other speeches for which Refah's leaders had been criticised had been made before the party came to power.
77. Lastly, the applicants submitted that the interference in issue was not proportionate to the aims pursued. They laid particular emphasis on the harshness of dissolving any political party on account of speeches made by some of its members, the scale of the political disabilities imposed on the three applicants, Mr Necmettin Erbakan, Mr Sevket Kazan and Mr Ahmet Tekdal, and the heavy financial losses suffered by Refah following its dissolution.
(ii) The Government
78. On the question whether Refah presented a danger at the time of its dissolution, the Government observed that the party had never exercised power alone and had therefore never had an opportunity to put its plan of setting up a theocratic State into practice. They submitted that if Refah had been the sole party in power it would have been quite capable of implementing its policy and thus putting an end to democracy.
79. The Government further submitted that the speeches criticised by the Constitutional Court were imputable to Refah. They pointed out that Article 4 of the party's constitution provided for the exclusion of members responsible for acts contrary to the decisions of its executive organs; under Article 5 of the constitution members who committed acts contrary to the party's constitution and programme were liable to the same penalty. The Government asserted that these provisions had never been applied to the Refah members guilty of the offending acts and statements.
80. Moreover, the plan to introduce a plurality of legal systems, which had never been abandoned by Refah, was clearly incompatible with the principle of non-discrimination, which was enshrined in the Convention and was one of the fundamental principles of democracy.
81. With regard to the question whether Refah supported the introduction of sharia in Turkey, the Government observed that it was not the party's official programme which caused a problem but the fact that certain aspects of the activities and speeches of Refah's leaders unambiguously indicated that the party would seek to introduce sharia if it held power alone. They pointed out that the concept of a “just order”, mentioned by Refah, had formed the basis for its campaign in the 1995 general election. In explaining the concept of a “just order” in the context of that propaganda Refah's leaders had clearly been referring to an order based on sharia.
82. The Government endorsed the opinion expressed by the Constitutional Court and in paragraph 72 of the Chamber's judgment that sharia is hard to reconcile with democracy and the Convention system. A theocratic State could not be a democratic State, as could be seen from Turkish history during the Ottoman period, among other examples. The Government mentioned a number of instances of incompatibility between the main rules of sharia and the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Convention.
83. The Government did not believe that Refah was content to interpret the principle of secularism differently. In their submission, the party wished to do away with that principle altogether. This was evidenced by the submissions made on Refah's behalf during the latest debates on amendment of the Constitution, since Refah had quite simply proposed deleting the reference in the Constitution to the principle of secularism.
84. As to the possibility of using force as a method of political struggle, the Government cited the statements of Refah members who advocated the use of violence in order to resist certain government policies or to gain power and retain it. They submitted that a number of acts and speeches by Refah members constituted incitement to a popular uprising and the generalised violence characterising any “holy war”.
85. The Government further observed that at the material time radical Islamist groups such as Hizbullah were carrying out numerous acts of terrorism in Turkey. It was also at that time that Refah members were advocating Islamic fundamentalism in their speeches, one example being a visit made by one of the applicants, Mr Sevket Kazan, the Minister of Justice at the time, to a mayor who had been arrested for organising a “Jerusalem evening” in a room decorated with posters showing the leaders of the terrorist organisations Hamas and Hezbollah.
(b) The Court's assessment
(i) General principles
(?) Democracy and political parties in the Convention system
86. On the question of the relationship between democracy and the Convention, the Court has already ruled, in United Communist Party of Turkey and Others v. Turkey (judgment of 30 January 1998, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998-I, pp. 21-22, § 45), as follows:
“Democracy is without doubt a fundamental feature of the 'European public order'... That is apparent, firstly, from the Preamble to the Convention, which establishes a very clear connection between the Convention and democracy by stating that the maintenance and further realisation of human rights and fundamental freedoms are best ensured on the one hand by an effective political democracy and on the other by a common understanding and observance of human rights... The Preamble goes on to affirm that European countries have a common heritage of political tradition, ideals, freedom and the rule of law. The Court has observed that in that common heritage are to be found the underlying values of the Convention...; it has pointed out several times that the Convention was designed to maintain and promote the ideals and values of a democratic society...
In addition, Articles 8, 9, 10 and 11 of the Convention require that interference with the exercise of the rights they enshrine must be assessed by the yardstick of what is 'necessary in a democratic society'. The only type of necessity capable of justifying an interference with any of those rights is, therefore, one which may claim to spring from 'democratic society'. Democracy thus appears to be the only political model contemplated by the Convention and, accordingly, the only one compatible with it.”
87. The Court has also confirmed on a number of occasions the primordial role played in a democratic regime by political parties enjoying the freedoms and rights enshrined in Article 11 and also in Article 10 of the Convention.
In the previously cited United Communist Party of Turkey and Others v. Turkey judgment it stated that it found even more persuasive than the wording of Article 11 the fact that political parties were a form of association essential to the proper functioning of democracy (loc. cit., § 25). In view of the role played by political parties, any measure taken against them affected both freedom of association and, consequently, democracy in the State concerned (ibid., § 31).
It is in the nature of the role they play that political parties, the only bodies which can come to power, also have the capacity to influence the whole of the regime in their countries. By the proposals for an overall societal model which they put before the electorate and by their capacity to implement those proposals once they come to power, political parties differ from other organisations which intervene in the political arena.
88. Moreover, the Court has previously noted that protection of opinions and the freedom to express them within the meaning of Article 10 of the Convention is one of the objectives of the freedoms of assembly and association enshrined in Article 11. That applies all the more in relation to political parties in view of their essential role in ensuring pluralism and the proper functioning of democracy (see United Communist Party of Turkey and Others v. Turkey, cited above, §§ 42 and 43).
89. The Court considers that there can be no democracy without pluralism. It is for that reason that freedom of expression as enshrined in Article 10 is applicable, subject to paragraph 2, not only to “information” or “ideas” that are favourably received or regarded as inoffensive or as a matter of indifference, but also to those that offend, shock or disturb (see, among many other authorities, Handyside v. the United Kingdom, judgment of 7 December 1976, Series A no. 24, p. 23, § 49, and Jersild v. Denmark, judgment of 23 September 1994, Series A no. 298, p. 26, § 37). Inasmuch as their activities form part of a collective exercise of the freedom of expression, political parties are also entitled to seek the protection of Article 10 of the Convention (see United Communist Party of Turkey and Others v. Turkey, cited above, p. 17, § 43).
(?) Democracy and religion in the Convention system
90. For the purposes of the present case, the Court also refers to its case-law concerning the place of religion in a democratic society and a democratic State. It reiterates that, as protected by Article 9, freedom of thought, conscience and religion is one of the foundations of a “democratic society” within the meaning of the Convention. It is, in its religious dimension, one of the most vital elements that go to make up the identity of believers and their conception of life, but it is also a precious asset for atheists, agnostics, sceptics and the unconcerned. The pluralism indissociable from a democratic society, which has been dearly won over the centuries, depends on it. That freedom entails, inter alia, freedom to hold or not to hold religious beliefs and to practise or not to practise a religion (see Kokkinakis v. Greece, judgment of 25 May 1993, Series A no. 260-A, p. 17, § 31, and Buscarini v. San Marino [GC], no. 24645/94, § 34, ECHR 1999-I).
91. Moreover, in democratic societies, in which several religions coexist within one and the same population, it may be necessary to place restrictions on this freedom in order to reconcile the interests of the various groups and ensure that everyone's beliefs are respected (see Kokkinakis v. Greece, cited above, p. 18, § 33). The Court has frequently emphasised the State's role as the neutral and impartial organiser of the exercise of various religions, faiths and beliefs, and stated that this role is conducive to public order, religious harmony and tolerance in a democratic society. It also considers that the State's duty of neutrality and impartiality is incompatible with any power on the State's part to assess the legitimacy of religious beliefs (see, mutatis mutandis, Cha'are Shalom Ve Tsedek v. France [GC], no. 27417/95, § 84, ECHR 2000-VII) and that it requires the State to ensure mutual tolerance between opposing groups (see, mutatis mutandis, Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia and Others v. Moldova, no. 45701/99, § 123, ECHR 2001-XII).
92. The Court's established case-law confirms this function of the State. It has held that in a democratic society the State may limit the freedom to manifest a religion, for example by wearing an Islamic headscarf, if the exercise of that freedom clashes with the aim of protecting the rights and freedoms of others, public order and public safety (see Dahlab v. Switzerland (dec.), no. 42393/98, ECHR 2001-V).
While freedom of religion is in the first place a matter of individual conscience, it also implies freedom to manifest one's religion alone and in
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